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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent, :

-v-

Case No. 18143

••

HOYT GLENNY,

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with forcible
sodomy in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-403 (1953), as

amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In a trial before a jury presided over by the
Honorable Louis G. Tervort and the Honorable Robert F. Owens,
conducted on October 28 and 29, 1981, in the Fifth Judicial
District Court in and for Iron County, Utah, appellant was
found guilty of forcible sodomy.

Accordingly, on December 11,

1981, appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than five
(5) years nor more than his natural life.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a judgment· and order of this Court
affirming the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On July 3, 1981, in Cedar City, Iron County, Utah,
John Thorpe Cooper, thirteen years old, was collecting
aluminum cans for the purpose of taking the cans to the
Safeway supermarket for recycling.

Cooper's rounds took him

by the American Motel in Cedar City and to Room 17 where
appellant, Hoyt Glenny, was residing at the time (T. 49).
Prior to this date, Cooper had met

a~pellant

•

on another

occasion when Cooper was around the motel searching for cans
(T. 49).

At that time, appellant told Cooper that he had some

cans and invited Cooper to stop by his room when he was in the
area again (T. 49).

Consequently, when Cooper returned to the

American Motel on July 3, he went to Room 17 and was invited
by appellant to enter his room (T. 49).

A discussion ensued

concerning Cooper's can collecting with appellant informing
Cooper that the boy could have a six pack of beer which was in
the refrigerator.

Cooper removed the six pack from the

refrigerator, drank a single can
remaining (T. 52).

of

beer and kept those

Appellant then asked Cooper if he would

run an errand for him to the Court Hotel where supposedly
appellant han some clothes (T. 53, 78).

Cooper proceeded to

the hotel on his bicycle but returned shortly to appellant's
room following his perfunctory visit to the Lunt Hotel (T.
53).

Despite the fact that Cooper was unable to obtain

appellant's clothes, appellant, after: shutting the door behind
-2-
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Cooper, gave him five dollars (T. 54).

Appellant next asked

Cooper to sit on his lap (T. SS, 67, 79).

Then appellant

kissed Cooper's lips and began rubbing Cooper's penis through
his long pants and underwear (T. SS, 56).

Appellant continued

nis fondling of the boy by unzipping Cooper's pants and
slipping off his undershorts (T. S6).

Appellant then invited

Cooper to join him on his bed where he continued to rub the
boy's penis (T. S7).

Once on the bea, appellant put his mouth

momentarily on Cooper's penis (T. 56, 57, 62, 68).

Cooper

struggled to get away from appellant but appellant attempted
to forcibly restrain him by pressing on Cooper's chest (T.
58).

Freeing himself from appellant's force, Cooper put on

his pants and bicycled home (T. 58).
Appellant's testimony differs from Cooper's in
certain respects as to what occurred following the boy's
return from the Lunt Hotel.

Appellant testified that when

Cooper returned from running the errand to the Lunt Hotel,
/

appellant gave him not five dollars, but two (T. 79, 87).
Appellant claimed that although he was fairly intoxicated when
Cooper sat on his lap he could not remember rubbing his hand
back and forth over Cooper's upper thigh after placing it
there (T. 80).

Appellant testified that he did remember

kissing Cooper on his forehead and not on the lips, as Cooper
had testified (T. 80).

Appellant stated that his lips did not

touch any other part of Cooper's body (T. 88).

Appellant

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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further claimed that he did not move from the chair to his bed
because of emphysema "compounded by drinking" which made
walking and drinking difficult (T. 80, 81).

Appellant

testified that he never unzipped Cooper's pants, removed
Cooper's underwear or touched Cooper's genitals (T. 81, 82).
Following consideration of the evidence, the jury
found appellant guilty of forcible sodomy (T. 101) •
ARGUMENT

••

POINT I
UNDER UTAH'S STATUTE, PENETRATION IS NOT
AN ELEMENT IN THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE
SODOMY.
Appellant was convicted of forcible sodomy
consistent with that crime's definition as set forth in Utah
Code Ann., S 76-5-403 (1953), as amended:
(1) A person commits sodomy when he
engages in any sexual act involving the
genitals of one person and the mouth or
anus of another person, regardless of the
sex of either participant.
(2) A person commits forcible sodomy when
he commits sodomy upon another without the
other's consent.
(3) Sodomy is a class B misdemeanor.
Forcible sodomy is a felony of the second
degree unless the victim is under the age
of 14, in which case the offense is
punishable as a felony of the first degree
(Emphasis added).
-4-
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In his brief, appellant admits that his mouth "was on the
peni~

of John Cooper, or to the penis of John Cooper, or that

there was contact between the [appellant's] mouth and John
Cooper, • • • " (Appellant's brief at 6).

The appellant,

.however, argues that notwithstanding these actions, he cannot
be guilty of forcible sodomy since there was no evidence at

trial concerning any penetration or insertion of appellant's
penis into the victim's mouth.

Ry citing a plethora of cases,

appellant attempts to resurrect penetration as an essential
element to be proven in any sodomy prosecution.

Appellant

directs this Court's attention to State v. Peterson, 81 Utah
340, 17 P.2d 925 (1933) in which the Court merely acknowledged
the parties' stipulation concerning the insertion of the
defendant's sexual organ into the mouth of the victim.
P.2d at 926.

17

However, in the case at bar we are neither tied

to a stipulation nor is one required in order to sustain a
conviction in light of more recent statutory enactments.
On its face, this state's sodomy statute does not
require penetration.

In Utah, a person is guilty of the crime

of sodomy simply by engaging "in any sexual act involving the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another • • • "
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-5-403(1) (1953), as amended.

Here, we

have appellant admitting to such involvement between his mouth
and John Cooper's penis, as well as the testimony of John
Cooper.

Contact or touching is the crucial element in this

-sSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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state's sodomy definition and not penetration.

It is

established that "any touching" is sufficient.

Utah Code

Ann.,. S 76-5-407 (1981 Supp.), as amended, states in pertinent
part:
(2) In any prosecution for unlawful sexual
intercourse, rape or sodomy, any sexual
penetration or, in the case of sodomy, any
touching, however slight, is sufficient to
constitute the offense (Emphasis added).
Appellant not only wrongly insists on penetration as
an element, but also argues that

•

the~Court

should rely on the

common law to help it out of a definitional quagmire.

This

Court explicitly stated in State v. Maestas, No. 17751
(decided July 21, 1982) that "common law definitions of
criminal behavior have no application in this jurisdiction."
Id. at p. 2.

The penal code adopted by this state clearly

abolished all common law crimes.
76-1-105 (1953), as amended.

See Utah Code Ann., S

Thus, it is unquestionable that

appellant's conduct constituted the crime of forcible sodomy
in that appellant's mouth did touch the penis of a thirteenyear-old boy, and no alliance to antiquated cases and statutes
can rescue appellant from the clarity of statutory realities.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT
REQUIRING TRANSCRIPTION OF CLOSING
ARGUMENTS.
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it
did not require the recording of the .. closing arguments of
-6-
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counsel.

In State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918 (1979), this

Court addressed the same issue when defendant argued that his
constitutional right to appeal had been deprived since closing
arguments were not transcribed.
~xplained

601 P.2d at 920.

The Court

that "it is not customary in our Courts, nor in most

courts, for the reporter to take down the arguments of
counsel, unless and to the extent directed by the trial
judge."

Id. at 920-921.

The trial judge's prerogative of

transcription is more than custom, it is statutorily
warranted.

Utah Code Ann., S 78-56-2 (1953), as amended,

provides:
It shall be the duty of the shorthand
reporter to attend all sessions of the
court, and to take full stenographic notes
of the evidence given and of all ·
proceedings had therein, except when the
judge dispenses with his services in a
particular cause or with respect to a
portion of the proceedings thereof • • •
(Emphasis added).
Appellant praises the value of judicial records and
/

respondent joins in that observation, but when the trial judge
has determined that no transcription of closing argument is
necessary, this decision "deprives no one of any essential
right."

Gray at 921.

Absence of the written record does not

leave future defendants, like appellant, in an environment of
predictable injustice and unfairness.

As this Court observed

in Gray:

..
-7-
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The trial judge, the defendant, and
counsel for both sides are all required to
be present. They are presumably paying
close attention to what is said in the
arguments~ and each has unfettered
opportunity to interrupt at any time and
request that any portion of an argument be
recorded, and to voice any objection
thereto he may desire.
Id. at 921.

Due to the omnipresence of these stabilizing

factors, the court in Gray warned against nmere shot-gun"
attacks against the non-recording of ·closing arguments.

Id.

at 921.
Appellant, in the case at bar, points to no specific
impropriety committed by the prosecution or the trial judge
during the course of closing arguments but instead chooses to
generally protest the lack of reporting.
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court did err in
not having closing arguments recorded, it is incumbent upon
appellant to specifically demonstrate prejudicial error for
there to be a reversal.

The Fifth Circuit, in Addison v.

United States, 317 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376

u.s.

905, 84 s.ct. 658, 11 L.Ed.2d 605, stay denied, 376

u.s.

u.s.

966,

936, 84 s.ct. 791, 11 L.Ed.2d 657, reh. denied, 376

84

s.ct.

1121, 11 L.Ed.2d 984, said:
• • • , the record is sile~t as to any.
objection made or any motion of any kind
filed with respect to any alleged
impropriety during the course of the final
-8-
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arguments of counsel. Nor have the
appellants in their original brief filed
in this case attempted to state that any
inf lamrnatory or improper comments were
made during their summations. Obviously,
even though a failure of the court
reporter to report the arguments of
counsel were an error per se, such error
would not be available to appellants to
work a reversal without a showing that it
was prejudicial error.
Id. at 811.

Here, as in Addison, appellant asks this Court

"to indulge a presumption of prejudicial error without any
••

basis," except in the nebulous allegation that the trial judge
was negligent in not mandating the court reporter's presence.
State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 542 P.2d 63, 67 (1975).

Such

imprecise objections are insufficient however in presuming
fundamental and reversible error from a silent record.

See

Fowler v. United States, 310 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1962).
Moreover, since the record is silent1 this Court is reluctant
"to reverse a conviction on matters debars the record."
v. Starlight Club, Utah, 406 P.2d 912, 913 (1965).

State

In State

v. Newmeyer, No. 17512 (decided August 19, 1981), the
appellant argued that the prosecutor's argument before the

jury regarding the plight of the victim constituted reversible
error.

This Court in Newmeyer stated that in light of the

fact that the particular remarks were not recorded "[W]e
cannot ascribe prejudiciality on the second-hand recital by
defense counsel of what he thought was said and which is not
before us."

Id. at 2.

Thus, appella?t's claim of error .fails
I

-9-
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either because of the statutory permissibility of not
recording closing arguments, the non-specificity of his claim,
or due to the intangible nature of his entire proposition.
POINT III
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S STATUTE, BY
BECOMING VOLUNTARILY INTOXICATED APPELLANT
VOLUNTARILY ABSENTED HIMSELF FROM JURY
SELECTION.

The appellant next argues

~hat

•

his absence from the

courtroom during the selection of the jury was not voluntary;
therefore his constitutional right to be present during all
the proceedings of his trial was violated requiring a reversal
of his conviction.

It cannot be argued that a defendant

enjoys the "basic right" of being present in the courtroom at
each stage of his trial and that his right to be present is
"guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
678 (Idaho 1972)1 See also:

State v. Carver, 496 P.2d 676,
Lewis v. United States, 146

u.s.

370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011/(1892)1 Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)1 Illinois v.

Allen, 397

u.s.

337, 90 s.ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).

That jury selection is considered an integral part of the
trial itself "is a matter of settled law."

Carver at 678.

Both united States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394

u.s.

908, 89 s.ct. 1018, 22 L.Ed.2d 219

(1969) and Knight v. state, 273 Ala • .,480, 142 so.2d 899 :·

-10-
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(Ala. 1962) dealt with the right of a defendant to be present
during voir dire.

Both courts linked defendant's right to be

present with his ability to assist with his defense.

As the

court in Carver observed:
The defendant may wish to challenge a
particular prospective juror for any one
of several valid reasons, or of which may
be a negative visceral reaction. That is
his long recognized privilege and one
which is important to the trial process.
Carver at 679.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Snyder
v. Commonwealth of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed.
674 (1934) involving "defendant's right to be present" relates
to the due process axioms:
heard and to defend oneself.

full and fair opportunity to be
Snyder concerned the absence of

defendant-during a viewing of the scene of the crime by the
jury.

In the court's majority opinion, Justice Cardozo

explained that the right to be present was violated:
• • • whenever [defendants'] presence has
a relation, reasonably substantial, to the
fulness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge • • • Again, defense
may be made easier if the accused is
permitted to be present at the examination
of jurors or the summing up of counsel,
for it will be in his power, if present,
to give advice or suggestion or even to
supersede his lawyers altogether and
conduct the trial himself.
Id. at 105-106 (Emphasis added).
-11-
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In State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676
(197~),

the defendants were not in the courtroom at the

beginning of voir dire and this was held to be constitutional
error in light of the rationale that:
• • • an accused's presence during voir
dire examination would be important in
determining which jurors may be acquainted
in some way with defendant, and vice
versa. Impartiality and objectivity would
be aided by the defendant's presence •
Id. at 679 (Emphasis added).

•
•

Here again we have a court

recognizing the defendant's right to be present during an
important stage of the trial yet couching it in terms of the
due process expectation that defendant's attendance would be a
possible asset in mounting and participating in his defense
and not a distinct detriment.
This court has recognized this "right which belongs
to every defendant" to be present but like other courts has
acknowledged the right's reasonable qualifications.
Myers, 508 P.2d 41, 42 29 Utah 2d 254 (1973).

State v.

In Myers, where

the defendant absconded intentionally from the jurisdiction,
the trial proceeded without him "since [i]t is a right which
may be waived under certain circumstances."

Id. at 42.

Under

Utah Code of Criminal Procedure,§ 77-35-17 (1981 Supp.) such
a waiver by the defendant is established.

The pertinent

sections provide:

-12-
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(a) In all cases the defendant shall have
the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel. The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the
following exceptions:
( 1)

•

•

•

(2) In prosecutions for offenses not
punishable by death the defendant's
voluntary absence from the trial after
notice to defendant of the time for trial
shall not prevent the case from being
tried and a verdict or judgment entered
therein shall have the same effect as if
defendant had been present~ • • •
(Emphasis added).
••

Appellant here asserts that he did not voluntarily absent
himself from the trial proceedings when he became
substantially intoxicated the morning of his trial.

The

transcript reveals that the prosecutor had learned of
appellant's inebriated state "through communications with Mr.
Thorley· (trial counsel for appellant) and also through the
Sheriff's·Office·in Cedar City, •

•

•"

(T. 3).

The prosecutor

then explained to the trial judge that defendant's condition,
if his presence were compelled during voir dire, "would
certainly be detrimental to his own interests, as well as the
interest of justice" (T. 3).

Defendant's counsel responded

that "while Mr. Glenny may have become intoxicated
voluntarily, he has not voluntarily absented himself from this
proceeding at this point in time" (T. 21).

Counsel continued

by arguing that although defendant's absence was a consequence

of what he did voluntarily, "· •• he has not directly
intended to do whatever has happened., in this case" (T. _4).
-13-
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Such an argument requires an amalgam of tortured
logic to find that defendant's voluntary choice of becoming
intoxicated can be considered separate and apart from the
natural and foreseeable consequences of his conduct which

-demands

no extraordinary prescience, just common sense.

In

short, appellant quite voluntarily and conveniently absented
himself from the courtroom the morning of the trial via his
•
•
As.this
Court held in Myers,

quite voluntary act of imbibing.
supra:

In the administration of justice a court
cannot be rendered helpless and impotent
by the devious and cunning ways of
defendants who might employ a host of
subtly ingenious strategies to prevent the
court from convening and proceeding.
Id. at 42.

As the Myers court explained, "To hold to the

contrary would permit a mischievously inclined defendant to
profit by his own wrongdoing."

Id. at 42-43.

It is only reasonable therefore to conclude that
appellant in this case knew or at least should have known that
his decision to begin drinking prior to his court appearance
might result in his absence from the courtroom due to the
court barring him from the proceeding because of the
prejudicial dangers inherent in his presence.

There is no

statutory requirement, in this state at least, that the
-14••
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.
~

.

waiver of the right to be present, i.e., the choice to be
voluntarily absent, be explicitly articulated by the
particular defendant; thus appellant's irresponsible behavior
alone was sufficient for the trial court to find that
defendant had indeed absented himself from voir dire--that
absence being implicitly definite and undeniably voluntary.
POINT IV

•

THE VICTIM, A 13-YEAR-OLD, WAS COMPETENT
TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW.
Under Utah law, only when a witness is under the age
of ten years must there be judicial determination concerning
the child's competency to testify.
2 (1953), as amended, provides in

Utah Code Ann.,
pert~nent

§

78-24-

part:

The following persons can be witnesses:
(2) Children under ten years of age, who
appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts respecting which
they are examined, or of relating them
truly.
/

The victim here, John Thorpe Cooper, was thirteen years old at
the time of his testimony.
(T.

).

The parties stipulated to his age

Thus, under the law, the prosecuting witness, a 13-

year-old, is not included within the application of the "under
ten" requirement of Utah Code Ann., S 78-24-2 (1953), as
amended, as appellant contends; but rather falls under the
-15-
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broader terms of Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-24-1, providing in
pertinent part:
All persons, without exception,
otherwise than as specified in this
chapter, who, having organs of sense, can
perceive, and, perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be
witnesses. • • •
However, as this court has long recognized, "not age, but
mental capacity, is the test of competency."
Zeezich, Utah, 61 Utah 61, 210 P.2d
also:

~27,

State v.

928 (1922).

See

State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 379, 58 P. 1108 (1899); State

v. Morasco, 42 Utah 5, 128 P. 571 (1912); State v. Macmillan,
46 Utah 19, 145 p. 833 (1915); State v. Dickson, 114 Utah 301,
199 P.2d 775 (1948); State v. Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 361
P.2d 174 (1961); State v. Mills, Utah, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975).
To be sure, age is a factor to consider in determining whether
a child of tender years is competent to testify, but it is
"not the sole criterion."

Sanchez, 361 P.2d at 175.

In

Sanchez, the appellant argued that the ten-year-old
prosecutrix was not competent as a witness since she
experienced some difficulty in understanding some of the
questions posed to her.

This Court held, however, that

although:
her responses might be viewed by some as
not entirely satisfactory, • • • it can
fairly be said that they showed a knowledge that it was a good and proper thing
to tell the truth and bad to lie •

.
-16-
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Id. at 175.
for

~he

The Court then explained "Allowance must be made

difference in capacities of individuals and no

particular age or degree of mental ability can be set as a
rigid standard."

Id.

This flexibility is possible:

[b]ecause of the position of the judge in
proximity to the trial and the witnesses
he is in an advantaged position to pass on
these matters, and the question whether a
child is qualified to be a witness must be
left largely to his judgment •
•

Id.

In State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965),

this Court held that what is essential in testing competency:
• • • is that it appear that the child has
sufficient intelligence and maturity that
she is able to understand.the questions
put to her; that she has some knwoledge of
the subject under inquiry and the facts
involved therein; that she is able to
remember what happened; and that she has a
sense of moral duty to tell the truth.
401 P.2d, 445 at 447.

In echoing the Sanchez holding, the

Court in Smith said that the determination of these tests "is
within the sound discretion of the trial court • • • His
ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing
of abuse.•

Id. at 447.
In the case at bar, there was certainly enough

evidence establishing John Thorpe Cooper's competency to
testify.

on direct examination, John was asked whether he

understood the oath and the importance of his telling the
-17-
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truth, to which he affirmatively responded (T. 48).

Moreover,

Cooper demonstrated knowledge regarding the time, place and
events surrounding appellant's criminal conduct.

He even

could recall the layout of the hotel room where appellant was
-

residing on the day of the crime (T. 50-51).
Thus, the trial court's allowing the 13-year-old

victim to testify was not an abuse of discretion and the
record is replete with indicia of codtpetency demonstrating the
soundness of the trial court's decision to hear the testimony
of young Cooper.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT GIVING
INSTRUCTIONS ON PENETRATION OR THE
VICTIM'S COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY.

Once again, appellant wrongly avers that penetration
is an essential element in the crime of forcible sodomy, but
in Utah no such instruction is relevant since common law
definitions were abolished through adoption of the criminal
code.

As respondent points out above, contact or touching is

the crucial element of sodomy and not penetration (See Point
I, supra).

The court therefore did not err in failing to

instruct the jury as to the common law element of penetration.
As for appellant's contention that it was reversible
error for the trial court not to give a cautionary instruction

-18-
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to the jury regarding the testimony of a minor, respondent
finds nothing in the transcript to show that one was requested
and finds no statute mandating the giving of such an
instruction every time a child of tender years testifies in a
courtroom.
In Hendersen v. Kibbe, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 431 U.S. 407
(1977),

Jus~ice

Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that:
•

Orderly procedure requires.that the
respective adversaries' views as to how
the jury should be instructed be presented
to the trial judge in time to enable him
to deliver an accurate charge and to
minimize the risk of committing reversible
error. It is the rare case in which an
improper instruction will justify reversal
of a criminal conviction when no objection
has been made in the trial court.
Id. at·154 (Emphasis added).

Similarly, this Court in State

v. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 191 (1976), held that one would be
precluded from claiming error when he "fails to make a proper
objection to an erroneous instruction, or to present to the
court a proper request to supply any claimed deficiency in the
instructions, • •

•

n

Id. at 193.

In so holding, this Court

recognized "the fact that the defendant did not, either by
submitting written requests, or by oral exceptions, point out
the claimed error and the remedies for the defects he now
claims existed in the instructions.•

Id. at 192.

In like

manner, defense counsel at appellant's trial made no objection
-19-
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to the absence of the cautionary instruction at the time and
thus should be barred from raising any protracted objection
here.

Admittedly, there is an exception to the timeliness

rule of Kazda, but it is applied "only rarely where there
appears to be a substantial likelihood that an injustice has
resulted."

Id. at 193.
In State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112

(1977), this Court amended the substantial likelihood of
4

injustice exception of Kazda to apply only in instances where
the failure to give certain instructions is so "palpable as
obviously to reflect prejudice amounting to a denial of due
process."

Id. at 1113.

No matter what the chosen

terminology, the point remains that unless the defendant
raises a timely objection to the court's failure in giving a
certain instruction, the subsequent conviction of the
defendant will not be reversed, except when a showing is made
of substantial and palpable prejudice.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

See also Rule 19(c),

The rarity of acknowledging

this exceptio indicates the heavy burden that must be assumed
and proven by a defendant in order for him to prevail on
appeal.
Appellant's assignment of prejudice here goes no
further than citing three cases:

State v. Morasco, supra,

State v. Zeezich, supra, and State v. Dixon, 199 P.2d 775
(1948), in which each victim was und~r ten years of age.~nd

the trial judges felt that the tender years of the victims
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necessitated a cautionary instruction on the issue of their
credibility.

Here, the victim is a 13-year-old and outside

the purview of Utah Code Ann.,

§

78-24-2 (1953), as amended.

Being appreciably older than appellant's cited youthful parade
of victims, John Thorpe Cooper and his testimony are not
subject to the same concerns that a trial judge might have
with respect to that of a younger witness.

Put simply, no

such instruction was requested, and even though the trial
judge opted not to give one, that choice is entirely within
his discretion since one is not required.

As this Court in

State v. Smith, supra, noted,
After the trial court is satisfied with
the competency of the witness, the final
judgment as to the credibility and the
weight to be given her testimony is for
the jury.
Id. at 447.

The jury's verdict is evidence of its confidence

in Cooper's credibility, and appellant's tardy objection
without more cannot overturn that unanimous belief in
appellant's guilt.
POINT VI
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
Lastly, we are facecd with appellant's argument,
frequently proffered by others like him, that he was deprived
-21,,
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of his constitutional right to effective counsel and as a
result his conviction should be reversed or at least remanded
in order that a new trial be commenced.

Appellant sets forth

a myriad of claims which together amount to no more than a
~pectrum

of speculation and a futile attempt to second-guess

the strategy of his trial counsel.
Ever since the United States Supreme Court
interpreted ··the Sixth Amendment to i9clude the right to
•

effective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287

u.s.

45, 53 s.ct. 55 (1932), there has been debate over what

standard of performance is demanded by that constitutional
guarantee.

Most of the circuits, either implicitly or

explicitly, have abandoned the "sham and mockery" test first
enunciated in Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 5, 148 F.2d
667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 u.s. 889, 65 s.ct. 1576, 89

L.Ed. 2002 (1945) and have replaced it with the higher
standard of "reasonably competent assistance" of counsel.

See

Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980) for evolution of
the standard.

In adopting this new test, the Tenth Circuit in

Dyer stated that the "Sixth Amendment demands that defense
counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a
reasonably competent defense attorney."

Id. at 278.

Recently, this Court stated that the four-pronged test coming
out of the Dyer standard requiring that defendant:
(1) establish proof of the ineffecti~.eness of counsel, (2.)
show that the ineffectiveness was due to the inadequacy of
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counsel and not as a result of trial strategy, (3) demonstrate
that better representation might have had some effect upon the
result of the trial, and (4) prove that motions and objections
which were not made would not have been futile if raised, does
have its parallels in Utah.

State v. Malmrose, Utah, No.

17661 (decided June 22, 1982).

In State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976) this
Court held that the Sixth Amendment tight to effective counsel
specifically entitles defendants to:
• • • the assistance of a competent member
of the Bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and consistent
with the ethics of the profession.
554 P.2d 203, ·204.

The McNicol court also stated that:

• • . • A defendant bears the
establishing the inadequacy
ineffectiveness of counsel,
such must be a demonstrable
not a speculative matter.

Id. at 203, 204 (Emphasis added).

burden of
or
and proof of
reality and

Respondent believes that

appellant's argument of ineffective representation has no
basis in reality and thus is relegated to delusional
hindsight.
It is quite clear that the Sixth Amendment guarantee
does not interfere with an attorney's "legitimate exercise of
judgment, as to trial tactics or strategy."
-23-
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In

State v. Wood, Utah, No. 16486, (decided May 13, 1982), we are
reminded again that:
Trial tactics lie within the
prerogative of counsel and may not be
dictated by his client. Decisions as to
what witnesses to call, what objections to
make, and, by and large, what defenses to
interpose, are generally left to the
professional judgment of counsel.
Id. at p. 28 of Wood opinion.
601 P.2d 918

(1979)~

See also:

State v. Gray, Utah,

State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69

(1978); State v. McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976).

It is

this reminder that appellant has either forgotten or ignored
in his desperation to find a conviction tainted by reversible
error.
Appellant's contention that trial counsel should
have moved for a change of venue into a supposed "liquor
liberated" forum such as Salt Lake County lacks any empirical
foundation.

Trial counsel probably concluded that the choice

of venue to remain in Iron County would certainly not harm
appellant's chances of acquittal since some of the jurors
might be acquainted with appellant.

The decision to remain in

Iron County was reasonable with nothing being revealed during
voir dire examination to the effect that appellant was not
being tried before a fair and impartial jury.
By the same token, appellant's claim that trial
counsel should have asked the prospective veniremen whether
•,
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they possessed any bias toward "imbibers" falls under the
strategic prerogatives alotted defense counsel under McNicol
and its progeny.

It is quite reasonable to conclude that

defense counsel wanted to de-emphasize appellant's penchant
~or

alcohol and believed that a specific question during voir

dire might only increase the grade of defendant's already
formidable evidentiary incline.
In considering the validity of appellant's next
claim of counsel's inefficacy, the Court need only turn to the
trial transcript to discover that trial counsel {who is also
an officer of the court) acted reasonably in notifying the
court (to ·the exclusion of the jury) of the reason for his
client's absence and that he impliedly did move for a
continuance when he argued that appellant had not voluntarily
absented himself from the proceedings when he became
voluntarily intoxicated and he "would desire his presence
during the choosing of the jury" (T. 4).

Despite this

argument, the trial judge found that appellant had voluntarily
absented himself from voir dire (T. 4, 5).
Finally, appellant complains that an expert witness
was needed to persuade the jury that alcoholics have a
diminished sex drive.

Once again, appellant asks this Court

to invade the realm of trial strategy which it has never done.
Such an Orwellian intrusion into defense counsel's tactical
decisions would strip the legal

prof~ssion

of its independence
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and integrity.

Appellant has offered nothing to show that if

such an expert did testify, the result of the trial would have
been different.

Indeea, such testimony would have been only

marginally helpful given the victim's testimony in this case.
Again, the decision as to what witnesses to call is within the
province of defense counsel.

Appellant makes other claims,

but we need not consider them here since an affidavit which
was attached as an addendum to appellant's brief and which was
•

subsequently stricken by stipulation from appellant's brief
formed the basis of those otherwise groundless claims.
When juxtaposed to the de rninimus standard of
"reasonable competence" reaffirmed in Malrnrose, respondent
submits that appellant's claims of ineffective legal counsel
fail because of their speculative nature or because his claims
involve trial strategy.

Respondent appreciates the frustra-

tions of Justice Crockett when he observed in State v. Harris,
30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 (1974):
In regard to the defendant's
contention that he was denied effective
counsel: we are impelled to remark that
it is nothing less than shameful that our
law seems to have degenerated to a point
where whenever an accused is convicted of
crime, the charge of incompetency of
counsel is, with ever increasing
frequency, leveled at capable attorneys
who have given entirely adequate service
when the real difficulty was that he had
a guilty client. In this respect also
defendant had his entitlement of adequate
representation by capable and
conscientious counsel.
-26-
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,

517 P.2d at 1315.

Here, we too have the cry of foul in the

guise of indiscriminate claims of inadequacy, and those facts
cannot erase the salient realities of a guilty appellant and
competent defense counsel.
CONCLUSION
Appellant alleges error on several points to obtain
a reversal of his conviction and sentence.

Respondent has

shown the weakness or illogic which Attaches to each of
appellant's allegations by relying on clear statutory
language, recent case law, or the trial transcript.

For all

of the above reasons, respondent respectfully urges this Court
to affirm appellant's conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of October,
1982.
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